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UNION TRUSTEESHIPS AND UNION DEMOCRACYt
Clyde W. Summers*
I start from the fundamental premise that unions should be
democratic. They must be democratic if they are to serve the
union movement's own mission and if they are to serve our
society's democratic values.
The historic tradition of the labor movement was to enrich
democratic values in society by making workers full members
of society and enabling them to have a greater voice in
shaping society. Consistent with that purpose, unions in their
internal governing structure have almost uniformly been built
on the democratic model, with officers elected by the vote of
the members and decisions made by vote in open meeting or
by elected representatives.
The declared purpose of the Wagner Act,1 enacted fifty
years ago, was to encourage and promote collective bargaining.
One of its goals was to bring a measure of democracy to the
workplace by giving workers an effective voice in decisions
governing their working lives. Neither the historic purpose of
unions nor the public purposes of the Wagner Act can be
fulfilled if unions are not internally democratic and members
do not have a free and open voice in choosing their officers and
in deciding union policies.
It was to help ensure that union members have such a free
and open voice that Congress enacted the Landrum-Griffin
Act 2 over thirty years ago. Title I constructed a Bill of Rights
for union members, guaranteeing freedom of speech and
assembly, equal rights in decision making, fair trial, and right
t Delivered as an address at the conference "The Government and Union
Democracy," held at the University of Michigan on March 17, 1990. Co-sponsored by
the Association for Union Democracy, Inc. and the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform, the conference focused on methods of restoring democracy to troubled
unions and on reforming union grievance procedures. Several citations are provided
to aid the reader.
* Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S.,
University of Illinois, 1939; J.D., University of Illinois, 1942; J.S.D., Columbia
University, 1952.
1. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
2. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988)).
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to legal recourse. Title IV established standards for fair and
open campaigns for union office and honest elections. In
addition, Title V imposed on union officers the fiduciary duty
to serve the interests of the union and its members.
One premise of Landrum-Griffin was that ensuring the
democratic process in unions would curb corruption and abuse
of power, thereby reducing the need for legal intervention. As
Senator McClellan said:
If we want fewer laws-and want to need fewer
laws-providing regulation in this field, we should start
with the basic things. We should give union members
their inherent constitutional rights, and we should make
those rights apply to union membership as well as to other
affairs of life. We should protect the union members in
those rights. By so doing we will be giving them the tools
they can use themselves.3
This brings us to a troubling fundamental question. If we
believe in union democracy, in the right of union members to
elect their officers and to decide their union's policies, how can
we justify imposing a trusteeship which displaces the officers
and deprives members of full control of their union? How can
we reconcile Landrum-Griffin's purpose of reducing the need
for governmental intervention with the government's naming
a trustee to run the union and supervise its affairs? The use
of government-imposed trusteeships must be troubling to
anyone who believes in the values of union democracy and
union freedom from government control.
We might comfort ourselves by remembering that unions
themselves have historically recognized the need to impose
trusteeships on local unions for corruption, abuses of power,
and violations of constitutional procedures. The effect of such
trusteeships is to suspend the democratic process at the local
level, its most vital place in the union structure, until the
abuses are corrected and the democratic process is reinstated.
The Landrum-Griffin Act, in Title III, provides for such
trusteeships to correct corruption or undemocratic practices,
makes them presumptively valid for eighteen months, and
allows them to continue as long as is needed to correct the
evils that caused them to be established.
3. 105 CONG. REC. 6476 (1959).
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Unions' use of trusteeships, however, provides small comfort
to us, for their use has often been abusive, with the very
purpose of curbing opposition groups at the local level and
reinforcing dictatorial control by national officers. Also, a
trusteeship imposed by the union does not raise the same
problem with union autonomy as a trusteeship imposed by
government. The troubling question of how to reconcile union
democracy and government trusteeship remains.
I find the trusteeship device distasteful and disturbing, but
when I look at the conditions that caused the courts to impose
them, I have a far more bitter taste and deeper disturbance.
Let us look at the facts of two of those cases.4
The first RICO trusteeship5 was imposed in 1986 on Local
560 of the Teamsters Union, aptly called the "Provenzano
Local." Tony Provenzano, a made member of the Genovese
Mafia family,6 with his brothers, was designated by the
Genovese family to gain control of Local 560 with some 10,000
members so the family could use and exploit it for their
benefit. They infiltrated and captured the union, with Tony
becoming president in 1958. He became president after
hijacking trucks and taking payoffs from employers for labor
peace. In 1960 he falsely registered voters and otherwise
manipulated the local union election. When the secretary-
treasurer politically opposed him, Provenzano had him
murdered by Mafia hit men. One of the murderers was later
made business agent of the local. In 1963, a union member
who spoke up in a union meeting to oppose the appointment
of a business agent was shot down in front of his home the
next morning.
Fear and intimidation effectively silenced all opposition.
Members who dared to raise questions were beaten or, with
the cooperation of the employer, discharged. Stewards refused
4. For a summary description of these two cases, along with other union trustee
cases, see the excellent article by Professor Goldberg, Cleaning Labor's House:
Institutional Reform Litigation in the Labor Movement, 1989 DUKE L.J. 903. For two
different views on the appropriateness of trusteeships, see Note, Government Civil
RICO Actions and Labor Unions: Reorganization and Innocent Persons, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 125 (1989) (authored by Michael G. Liebman) (trusteeships violate
RICO), and Note, Union Receiverships Under RICO: A Union Democracy Perspective,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1989) (authored by Eric Ames Tilles) (trusteeships can be
necessary remedy).
5. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J.
1984), affd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
6. Id. at 304.
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to file grievances or the grievances were denied through a
rigged procedure, and the discharged employees were driven
from the industry. Contributing to the climate of fear and
intimidation was the Provenzano Executive Board's systematic
appointment of known criminals and labor racketeers to
positions of control such as business agent and trustee.
Members who might raise their voices well knew, or soon
learned, the kind of persons with whom they would have to
contend.
Criminal prosecutions did not loosen the grip of the
Provenzano group, for the Mafia could always provide replace-
ments. The Provenzanos themselves played musical chairs
when one or another was criminally convicted and barred from
union office. When Tony was sent to prison for labor extor-
tion, he made his brother Nunzio, who had previously been
convicted of labor extortion, president of the local. After
Tony was released and was eligible, he was made secretary-
treasurer and in effect ran the union. When he was again
sent to prison for causing the murder of his rival, taking
kickbacks on member benefit funds, and extortion, he made
his daughter secretary-treasurer. When Nunzio was sent to
prison, brother Salvatore became president.
For nearly 30 years the Provenzano group ruled Local 560
with iron fists of physical violence and through control of
members' jobs. During this time the forms of democratic
process were observed. Officers and stewards were elected,
almost always unopposed, union meetings were held, and
votes taken-by show of hands-always supporting the
Provenzano group. For example, while Tony was in prison on
a life sentence for murdering his political opponent, and
concurrently serving sentences for selling labor peace and
taking kickbacks on a union benefit fund, the Executive Board
proposed to give him a $65,000 a year pension. To demon-
strate that all democratic forms were followed, the Board
mailed notices to all members, held an open meeting, made a
motion to grant the pension, and opened the floor for discus-
sion. Numerous members made speeches praising Tony, no
one spoke in opposition, and the vote by show of hands was
unanimous. Democracy in Local 560 was completely dead;
there was no voice of opposition to even the most gross abuses.
The forms of democracy were but a shell, cynically observed to
obscure the reality that the members had no voice.
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The Philadelphia Roofers provide another example.' For
twenty years, the election of the business manager, who was
the chief officer of the local union, had never been contested.
In 1981, the business manager was murdered by a Mafia hit
man, shot in his home on Christmas Eve by a man delivering
a poinsettia as a "gift." His successor, Stephen Traitz, was
elected unopposed; his opponent, the acting president, with-
drew his candidacy and left the industry when he learned that
the local leader of the Mafia had sent out the word that Traitz
was "their man."
The union officers and business agents engaged in a system-
atic program of terrorizing nonunion roofers and their employ-
ers by threatening to throw them off roofs, beating them up,
slashing tires, vandalizing trucks, and destroying roofs. The
main object was to compel payments into the union's medical,
welfare, and legal funds which the officers then milked for
other purposes, including making "gifts" to local judges. Mafia
associates and convicted criminals were given jobs, and
business agents served as Mafia enforcers. As a result of
these activities, thirteen of the officers and business agents
were convicted on more than 160 counts of coercion and
corruption.
Because these convictions disqualified the officers from
continuing to serve, the officers called a special election and
named a slate of candidates made up of business agents and
others who had been part of their support group. An opposing
slate was formed, but its candidates and their supporters were
threatened in the union hall and disrupted in their efforts to
distribute campaign literature. They were followed to their
jobs, where they and their employers were threatened; they
were discharged and denied referrals from the hiring hall.
The convicted officers' slate won the election and reappointed
all of the business agents who had served the old regime. As
the court observed, the result was that union members
legitimately "fear attending meetings .... Their fear is that
if they go to the Union Hall to resolve a dispute or prob-
lem ... they will be outnumbered, intimidated, threatened
with physical violence and/or physically beaten."' Terror, not
democracy, continued to reign in the union; members dared
not raise their voices concerning the conduct of union affairs.
7. United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers Ass'n,
686 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
363 (1989).
8. Id. at 1162.
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The other cases in which trusteeships have been imposed
have had the same general characteristics. Local 6A of the
Cement and Concrete Workers was alleged to have become a
captive organization of the Columbo Crime Family, and to
have been used to extort payoffs from contractors, to steal
union funds, and to create a climate of intimidation and fear
by physical violence and control of jobs. The union agreed to
a consent decree creating what was termed a trusteeship.9
Teamster Local 814 was alleged to be in the stranglehold of
the Bonanno Crime Family, with the officers engaged in
extortion and labor racketeering. Again, the union agreed to
a consent decree. 10
When we look squarely at the facts of these cases, the
seeming contradiction between union democracy and union
trusteeships disappears. The trusteeship in Local 560 did not
destroy union democracy; it did not deprive the members of
control over their union. Democracy in Local 560 was dead;
the Provenzano group had seized control and exploited it for
the benefit of the Mafia. Stephen Traitz was not chosen by
the members of the Roofers Local, but by the Mafia, and he
served the Mafia's purposes. The new officers were not freely
chosen by the members, but were chosen by convicted officers
and elected in a climate of intimidation produced by pervasive
violence and denial of job rights.
We know now from sad experience that although Senator
McClellan was largely correct that the democratic process can,
in most cases, curb corruption and oppression, those control-
ling a union can effectively destroy the democratic process and
foreclose its regeneration. We see from these cases that even
the most vigorous criminal prosecution may not free a union
from the Mafia's tentacles. New heads and arms appear to
replace those cut off. Those sent to prison name their succes-
sors and return to power when their time is served.
What shall we do when racketeers have gained such
influence and control? Shall we, in the name of union
democracy, leave union members in the grip of those who have
mocked or destroyed union democracy? Shall we, in the name
9. For background on this case, see United States v. Local 6A, Cement &
Concrete Workers Int'l Union, 663 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
10. This was part of a larger effort against an organized crime family. See
United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 683 F. Supp. 1411, 1419
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (summarizing government actions against the Bonanno Family),
affd, 879 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989).
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of union autonomy, withhold the hand of government and
leave unions in the hands of the Mafia? These are the only
alternatives-leave the union and its members in the grip of
those who subvert and destroy the democratic process, or
impose a trusteeship that will restore the union to its mem-
bers and the democratic process. When viewed in their factual
contexts, these trusteeships do not contradict fundamental
principles of union democracy and union autonomy. Indeed,
for one who believes deeply in union democracy, these trustee-
ships offer the last hope that these unions can fulfill the labor
movement's traditional purposes and society's democratic
goals.
The justification for imposing trusteeships in these cases
dictates the limits within which the remedy should be used
and the purposes toward which the trusteeship should be
directed. First, a trusteeship should not be imposed except
where it is clear that corrupt and abusive leadership has
obtained such a stranglehold that members no longer have the
possibility of removing the officers, ending the corruption, and
deciding union policies through the democratic process. This
will seldom be the case except where there is pervasive
intimidation from fear of physical violence or loss of livelihood.
It will be most often the case where the Mafia has obtained
significant influence and control.
Second, the central purpose of the trusteeship should not be
just to remove the officers, or to end the corruption and abuse
of powers, necessary as these are. The ultimate and overrid-
ing objective must be to reestablish an effective and vital
democratic process within the union. With democracy re-
stored, the union can again fulfill its historical social and
political purpose, and the members can help protect the union
from those who would exploit it for their own ends. Only
solidly established democracy offers any hope of permanent
cleansing.
This leads to the crucial practical question: How shall the
trusteeship be constructed and conducted? What powers and
functions should the trustee have, and how should they be
exercised? What measures are necessary to plant solid
democratic roots in a union that has been controlled so
corruptly as to justify imposing a trusteeship? We do not
know the full answer, for our experience is limited, and none
of the trusteeships have thus far been fully successful in
reestablishing membership control through a solidly rooted
SPRING AND SUMMER 1991]
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democratic process. Our experience has taught us more of
what will not work than what will work.
We can, however, learn some significant lessons by examin-
ing the operation of judicial intervention in Local 560 and the
Philadelphia Roofers. Judge Ackerman, in imposing the Local
560 trusteeship, ordered that the current executive board be
removed and replaced by a trustee with "all authority and
power to act as he may ... see fit to administer the affairs...
of Local 560, and to create and foster conditions under which
reasonably free, supervised elections can be held. . . ."" The
trusteeship was to continue for such period of time as might
be necessary to eliminate the racketeer influence and restore
democratic processes in the union. Judge Ackerman concluded:
The current Executive Board members must be removed
as a predicate to the restoration of union democracy
within Local 560 .... The evidence clearly points to the
fact that the members view the leadership of the Local as
a single, monolithic control organization. So long as it, or
any portion of it, remains in actual control of Local 560
... it will be very difficult to remove the sense of fear
which the members now experience. This sense of fear
within the Local-causing members to believe that it is
not safe to protest or organize-is so overwhelming that it
is not likely to correct itself in the foreseeable future. 2
Judge Ackerman correctly granted the trustee all of the
powers required and perceptively pointed out the measures
needed. Unfortunately, the trustee did not exercise those
powers fully and did not take the necessary measures.
The remedy was stayed during two years of appeal. During
those two years, President Salvatore Provenzano was con-
victed of defrauding a local benefit fund and taking kickbacks
on a dental plan. He was replaced by Mikey Sciarra, a prot~g6
of Tony Pro and a member of the executive board. The pattern
of corruption and intimidation continued, while the
Provenzano group planned how to deal with the trusteeship.
11. Order Appointing Trustee, United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, C.A. No. 82-689 (D.N.J.) (June 23, 1986) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
12. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 321
(D.N.J. 1984), affd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
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When the trustee was appointed, he failed to recognize the
pervasiveness of fear and the monolithic character of the
control organization. For more than six months he retained
business agents from the old regime, including Joseph
Sheridan, who had been removed as vice-president, and he left
in place the shop stewards who had served under the old
regime. He left hanging in a prominent place in the union
hall a large portrait of Tony Provenzano, symbolically honor-
ing him and legitimizing his regime. The court's presumption
that an election would be held within eighteen months13 was
not contradicted by the trustee. In the meantime, the Proven-
zano group, led by Sciarra, formed a "Teamsters for Liberty"
organization opposing the trusteeship, demanding an election,
and preparing to return to power. Sciarra and the Teamsters
for Liberty did not repudiate the Provenzanos or the practices
of the old regime. On the contrary, Tony continued to be an
idol, and the trustee the destroyer of democracy and member-
ship control.
The message to the union members was clear. When the
trusteeship was terminated, the Provenzano group would
return to power and its practices would be resumed. Anyone
who criticized the Provenzano regime or opposed Mikey
Sciarra or the Teamsters for Liberty would suffer the same
fate as those who preceded them. Understandably, no
significant opposition emerged.
After a year, Judge Ackerman appointed a new trustee,14
who removed Tony's portrait, improved administration of the
union's pension and benefit funds, and published a monthly
newspaper. However, he treated Sciarra and the reincarnated
Provenzano group as a legitimate political organization,
allowing it to use the newspaper to praise the Provenzanos
and condemn the trusteeship. Shop stewards, carried over
from the old regime, with their control over grievances,
comprised the backbone of the Teamsters for Liberty and
coerced members to sign petitions opposing the trusteeship
and demanding an election. As a result, union members still
saw little real prospect that the grip of the Provenzano group
would be broken, and few were willing to risk their futures by
supporting an opposition group. Although no strong opposi-
tion group had emerged, and the dominant voice in the union
13. Id. at 337.
14. United States v. Local 560, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2190 (D.N.J. 1987).
SPRING AND SUMMER 1991]
698 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:3 & 4
was one praising Tony and the old regime, the trustee
scheduled the election after an additional year. In doing so,
he relied in part on the expectation that Sciarra could be
barred from running, and that without him as a candidate the
Teamsters for Liberty would split or become ineffective.
When Sciarra and John Sheridan, vice-president under the
Provenzanos, were nominated, the government brought
proceedings to have them disqualified because of their
connections with the Mafia, continued use of intimidation,
misuse of union funds, making of sweetheart agreements, and
other acts of corruption during the two years the trusteeship
order was on appeal. Judge Debevoise, before whom these
proceedings came, declared, "If they [Sciarra and Sheridan]
are now returned to office upon the termination of the
Trusteeship, it is highly likely that the Genovese Family,
through them, would reassert control over Local 560. "15
He enjoined Sciarra and Sheridan from running for office,
but he did not grant the government's request to bar them
from participating in union activities. The Teamsters for
Liberty immediately substituted Mikey Sciarra's brother,
Danny, and Joseph Sheridan's nephew, Mark, as candidates.
The ballot thus carried the names of Sciarra and Sheridan,
and everyone understood who were the real candidates.
The members' fears were self-fulfilling. The Provenzano
group returned to power and one of its first acts was to
appoint Mikey Sciarra business agent. The government asked
Judge Debevoise to bar Sciarra from serving as business agent
and participating in the union's affairs, but this request was
rejected. Sciarra immediately proceeded to dominate union
meetings, telling his brother how to proceed, answering
questions directed to the chair, and making long speeches from
the podium concerning union policies and insisting that he
should be made a trustee of the union benefit funds. Those at
the meeting treated him as de facto president and his brother
as a figurehead. Although the trustee continued to exercise
some supervisory functions, particularly over union funds, the
Provenzano-Sciarra group regained effective control.
A year too late, Judge Debevoise, who had refused to bar
Mikey Sciarra from becoming business agent, confronted by
videos of union meetings and other evidence of Sciarra's role
15. United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 694 F. Supp. 1158, 1191 (D.N.J.), affd,
865 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1068 (1989).
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in the union, ordered him removed as business agent and
barred him from any further participation in union activi-
ties. 16  By that time the Provenzano-Sciarra group had
entrenched itself and a new leader acceptable to the Mafia
could be designated to continue the pattern of corruption and
intimidation. The "sense of fear" which Judge Ackerman
recognized would continue "so long as it [the Executive Board
of the Local], or any portion of it, remains in actual control of
Local 560"" has not dissipated. The nascent political activity
that temporarily existed in the local has withered and will
quickly disappear.
The Philadelphia Roofers story is shorter but not sweeter.
Judge Bechtle acknowledged that the abuses were so serious
and pervasive that the most drastic remedy, including
dissolving the union, would be justified. However, because
"court-imposed trusteeships have not worked as well as
expected," he did not appoint a trustee but a "Chief U.S. Court
Liaison Officer," terming the arrangement a "Decreeship." 8
The liaison officer was to observe all face-to-face negotiations
between the union and employers, have access to all of the
union's records, approve the use of any union funds for other
than ordinary business expenditures, and make an audit of
the local's treasury and its various pension and benefit
funds. 19
The defect of a trusteeship, Judge Bechtle said, was that it
attempted to force onto the union leadership and membership
an "authority figure ... replacing individuals and policies that
have theretofore in great measure been supported, enforced,
or at least tolerated by the very membership who would be
ruled over by the unwanted trustee." ° The thirteen con-
victed officers and business agents were barred from holding
any union office or position of authority in the industry, but
the court left in office their replacements. The new officers
had been subordinates in the old regime, and were elected on a
slate hand-picked by those convicted, in an election permeated
16. United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 736 F. Supp. 601 (D.N.J. 1990).
17. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 321
(D.N.J. 1984), affd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
18. United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers Ass'n,
686 F. Supp. 1139, 1167-69 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 363 (1989).
19. Id. at 1171-74.
20. Id. at 1167.
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with intimidation by threats of violence, retaliatory dis-
charges, and job denial. The message to the membership was
explicit: the old regime with new faces remained in control,
with the court's endorsement. The members' fears of retalia-
tion did not dissipate, and few would dare to criticize or
oppose the leadership.
The results were foreseeable. Union financial practices have
improved, but there has been little progress toward internal
union democracy. Any who raise their voices in protest or
oppose the officers are denounced in union meetings, risk
discharge by their employers, and are denied referrals at the
union hiring hall. The court ordered an election one year after
the "decreeship" was established, but that election, like the
preceding one, was permeated with intimidation. At a
membership meeting prior to the election, the incumbents
generated enough hostility toward the opposition candidates
to drive them from the meeting. Although Judge Bechtle said
that the decree should be applied "to protect, as much as
possible, the right of Union members to fully participate in the
Union affairs, including the right to vote, to assemble, to
speak freely, to be treated fairly,"2' the decree did not make
possible the protection of democratic rights. It left the union
in the control of "authority figures" who were part of the
regime that had systematically denied these rights.
The experiences in these two cases, confirmed in other cases,
demonstrate what must be done if the trusteeship is to have
any reasonable hope of success in reestablishing the democratic
process within the union. Decriminalization of a union
requires measures not unlike those used to "de-Nazify"
occupied Germany after World War II. Because racketeer
control relies heavily on intimidation, making members fearful
for their lives or their livelihood, the court and trustee must
make clear that they will take whatever steps are needed to
eliminate all influence or control by the old regime. By their
conduct they must give members positive assurance that
those who were in power will not return to power. Only then
can the fear that silences and paralyzes the members be
sufficiently dulled. Only then will new political groups and
leaders emerge to repudiate those whose practices required
the trusteeship, to establish a solidly rooted democratic
21. Id. at 1173.
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process, and to develop a leadership dedicated to preserving
that process.
The first step must be to remove from office and positions of
influence all of those who were part of the corrupt regime and
bar them from participating in union affairs for a substantial
period of time. This was the most crucial weakness in both
the Local 560 and Philadelphia Roofers cases. It is not enough
to remove the officers, for they will be replaced by subalterns
or relatives. The members will not be reassured by a game of
musical chairs. Nor is it enough to remove those proven guilty
of wrongdoing; they are but the most visible fraction of the
control group. As Judge Ackerman rightly observed, union
members view the leadership as a monolithic control organiza-
tion, and so long as any portion of the leadership remains in
control the members will continue to have a sense of fear and
believe that it is not safe to protest or organize.
Removal of all those associated with the old regime may
reach some who have not been guilty of any personal wrong-
doing, and even some who found the coercion and corruption
distasteful. But all of them knew of the activities, participated
in them, personally benefitted from them, and held themselves
out as supporters of them. They are not innocents, and by
continuing in the administration of the union they will
perpetuate the members' fear that nothing will change.
The leadership must not only be removed, but must be
barred from participating in union affairs for a substantial
period to ensure that the chain of control is completely broken.
Although the leaders are removed from office, the roots of the
racketeering organization remain, and the members' fear
persists. If those associated with the leadership continue to
be politically active, deposed leaders like Sciarra in Local 560
can resume a leadership role, reconstitute their organization,
again subvert the democratic process and return to power. An
open political process cannot develop, nor can a fully free
election be held, as long as members see that prospect.
Political rights ought not be denied lightly, but those whose
conduct has brought about the need for the trusteeship have
forfeited those rights by their gross abuse of them.
Second, when the trusteeship is established, no fixed
termination date should be stated or even suggested. The
decree should state explicitly that the trusteeship will con-
tinue for as long as is needed to reestablish the democratic
process. This is a central weakness in the consent decree with
SPRING AND SUMMER 1991]
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the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,22 which requires
that the election be held at the end of two years. Although the
investigation officer has authority to bring charges against
and remove officers of the union, it is not likely that he will be
able to eliminate the Mafia influence within that time limit.
In cases like Local 560 it is impossible to know in advance
how long it will take to for the fear to dissipate, for open
debate to appear, and for political groups with credible
leadership to emerge. When the members have been intimi-
dated and all opposition silenced for years, the habits of
noninvolvement have become ingrained, skills of political
leadership have been lost, and many members have come to
accept passively that they have no voice in the union.
If it is indicated that the trusteeship will terminate on some
fixed date, the ousted group, like the Teamsters for Liberty,
will use all available means, including harassing litigation, to
frustrate the trusteeship and delay any corrective action
before that time. They know that they need only hold their
organization together until an election is held and the trustee-
ship is terminated. The members are put on notice that after
that date they will lose protection and the paralyzing fear will
continue. If the court and trustee make clear at the outset
that the trusteeship will continue until all influences of the
corrupt regime are eliminated, until members freely discuss
union leadership and policies, until political groups have
developed, and until a fully fair and open election can be held,
the racketeers will likely see little future in the union and will
leave.
Trusteeships may need to be extended for substantial
periods. Rooting out an entrenched corrupt leadership and
eradicating the effects of years of intimidation and oppression
cannot be accomplished quickly, even with the most vigorous
purgative action. The danger is that the court and trustee,
out of impatience, frustration, or weariness with the burden
of administration, and with over-optimism from small signs of
political activity will, as with Local 560, terminate the
trusteeship too soon, and the old regime will return to power.
Experience counsels that doubts ought to be resolved in favor
of extending the trusteeship to reduce the likelihood that the
whole effort will have been in vain.
22. For a description of that consent decree, see United States v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1990).
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There is one crucial test of whether the union is ready for an
election. Until the dominant political voices in the union
explicitly denounce the leadership and policies that led to the
trusteeship, there is no assurance that an election will not
simply reincarnate the old regime. Open and general denunci-
ation of the old regime is the best evidence that the residue of
fear has dissipated and that the democratic process will
prevent a recurrence of corruption and oppression. In Local
560, the Teamsters for Liberty, which was the strongest and
most vocal political group within the union, continued to
praise the Provenzanos, and Sciarra continued to tout Tony as
his idol. Those facts alone made clear that the union was not
yet ready for an election, and that the political process would
not prevent recurrence of the evils which required the trustee-
ship. Holding an election at that time was equivalent to
holding an election in occupied Germany, with the strongest
party campaigning on a platform praising Hitler and the Third
Reich and running a slate headed by former leaders in the
Nazi regime.
The third crucial requirement is that union officers be
deprived of the ability to exercise arbitrary control over
members' jobs through the grievance procedure or the hiring
hall. These are more subtle instruments for intimidation than
physical violence, but more readily available and equally
effective. The legal duty of fair representation and the section
8(b)(2)23 prohibition against discrimination are wholly inade-
quate to assure members who have been systematically
victimized in the past that they will not continue to be subject
to retaliation for opposing union leaders or criticizing their
policies. The union procedures must be reconstructed to
prevent such victimization. Members who are discharged or
otherwise disciplined, or who claim discrimination, must be
guaranteed ultimate recourse to a neutral arbitrator free from
union influence. The hiring hall procedures must be restruc-
tured to guarantee that all job referrals will be made on
preestablished objective standards and will be open to scrutiny
by any member.
Termination of the trusteeship requires holding an election,
and it is crucial that this be conducted in a way that helps
root and reinforce the democratic process. As already stated,
those who were part of the old regime and were removed
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1988).
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should be disqualified as candidates and barred from actively
participating in the election campaign. Also, the election
should not be held until a rebirth of political activity in the
union gives positive assurance that the corrupt leadership and
practices will be repudiated.
More is required, however. All political groups and candi-
dates must have full and equal opportunity to make their
views known to the members. This requires open access to
membership lists and to the union newspaper, and the right
to mail campaign literature to the members. The polling
places must be policed, and the counting of the ballots
supervised. In short, the court's supervision of the election
process should be at least as intensive, if not more intensive,
than a court-supervised election under Title IV of Landrum-
Griffin. For years elections have been exercises measuring
members' fears and ratifying racketeer control. Special
protection is required to assure members that this election will
fairly measure their preferences and will provide a model for
future elections.
When the trusteeship does not remove the officers, as in the
case of the Philadelphia Roofers and the consent decree with
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the need for
special supervision and rules for the election is much greater.
The incumbent officers have large built-in advantages in the
election. They have name recognition and control of the
channels of communication, the leverage to raise campaign
funds and ready access to the membership lists, and a paid
staff whose continuing contact with local union officers and
members provides daily opportunities to do favors and solidify
support. Special measures need to be taken to help offset
these advantages or the election will only reconfirm the
incumbents' control.
In constructing the election process, the court should
consider the importance of reducing the officers' monolithic
control, which helps corrupt groups maintain power. Unions
tend to become one-party bureaucracies, with the administra-
tion having a monopoly over channels of communication,
patronage, naming of committees and subordinates, and the
ability to do favors for supporters. This monolithic control can
be contained by creating voting districts with officers elected
by separate constituencies. These officers, with their separate
political bases, can loosen the monolithic control, for they have
a measure of independence from the central administration
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and can provide leadership and political support for opposition
groups. They provide a potential for ousting corrupt leader-
ship through the democratic process.
An example of how an election might be constructed and
timed to maximize the likelihood of establishing a lasting
democratic process might be seen in the lost opportunity of
Local 560. Shop steward elections could have been held first,
for political groups can emerge more quickly where members
have daily contact. These elections would have provided
members with political experience, generated political groups,
and given the elected shop stewards leadership experience and
recognition. The conduct of these elections would also have
enabled the court and trustee to test the political climate and
judge whether the union was ready for further elections.
Election of business agents could have been the next step,
with each business agent elected by the district that he or she
served. This would have given the members additional
political experience, developed larger political groupings, and
produced potential leaders. These elections would have
further indicated the vitality of the political process, and the
advisability of holding an election of officers and terminating
the trusteeships. This process would have assured that the
trusteeship did not end with the old regime in control, and
would have established shop stewards and business agents
with a measure of political independence, enabling competing
political groups to survive.
It is quite true, as Judge Bechtle observed, that trusteeships
have not worked as well as expected, but that is not because
judicial intervention has reached too far, but because it has
been too limited and too quickly withdrawn. It is not so much
that the court has imposed an authority figure on the union,
as it is that the court has permitted those who participated in
the abuses that required the trusteeship to remain or reestab-
lish themselves as authority figures. There has been an
unwillingness to take the measures or the time needed to
remove the roots of control and eradicate the fear on which it
feeds.
This raises the final question: why has there been an
unwillingness to take the measures necessary to give trustee-
ships a hope of success? First, there is an understandable and
quite proper reluctance to intervene in the internal processes
of unions. That reluctance is born of a recognition that unions
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should govern their own affairs, and that courts are poor
instruments for correcting internal union problems. Although
confronted with evidence of massive corruption, the systematic
use of violence, the denial of jobs to perpetuate racketeering
control, and the death or perversion of democratic processes,
the courts and trustees are pressed to adopt the least intru-
sive solutions. The very burden of supervision encourages
over-optimism that the job has been accomplished and that
the trusteeship can be terminated.
Second, there has been an understandable failure to
recognize how difficult it is to root out racketeer influence
when it has become entrenched in the union. The officers are
able, by their control of the union, to build an organization
whose tentacles penetrate the whole union structure. The
corrupt leaders and their organization are also supported by
those members for whom they have found jobs or done other
favors. When the trusteeship removes the officers, the
underlayers of the administration remain; those who owe their
positions or jobs to the deposed leaders or who have received
favors may remain loyal, and the organization survives with
replaced leaders. Many other members are unaware of the
corruption and oppression; they do not know that their benefit
funds are being looted, that sweetheart contracts are being
made, and that payoffs are being taken for labor peace. They
have jobs, and the union leaders negotiate increased wages
and benefits, so the members ask no questions and have no
problems. Dissenters who have been discharged or denied
work at the hiring hall are no longer present to protest.
Disclosure of abuses by the trusteeship proceedings may
weaken but not dissolve the corrupt regime's support, for
many will not believe or will discount the disclosures. The
officers may solidify their support by painting the trusteeship
as another attack on the labor movement, and this claim is
strengthened when echoed by the AFL-CIO.
Removing racketeer influence is even more difficult when
the union has been infiltrated by the Mafia. Mafia members
and associates in the union are difficult to identify and
remove. Its organization, being outside the union, remains
untouched. The Mafia can continue to supply leaders and
enforcers to reassemble remnants of the corrupt regime,
maintain the climate of fear, and regain control with a new
cast of characters.
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We ought not judge the courts too harshly for their reluc-
tance to intervene more forcefully, for the evils should be
remedied with the least intrusion possible. Nor ought we to
criticize too sharply their failure to realize that deeper
intrusion was necessary, for probably no one fully recognized
the difficulty of eliminating racketeer control, and particularly
Mafia influence, from a union and restoring the democratic
process. Experience has now taught us that the lesser
measures used are not sufficient; more forceful and longer
continued measures are needed. We do not know yet from
experience whether greater trusteeship intervention can free
unions from the grip of racketeers. But a trusteeship properly
empowered and pursued offers hope that a union now cap-
tured by such corruption can be freed and returned to the
control of its members. We must keep trying, for otherwise we
surrender these unions to the Mafia and send the message
that other unions are theirs for the taking.
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